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* Editor's Note.- Professor Reisman was commissioned by the United Nations
Conference on New & Renewable Sources of Energy (UNERG) to prepare this report
as a companion piece to Mr. Joseph's report. It is also being used as an integral
working paper in preparation for the August 1981 UNERG conference. Professor
Reisman's report is based on the best available legal information as of March, 1980,
and, as is the case of any report prepared in advance, significant changes could occur
by the time of the Conference. The JOURNAL publishes this report in substantialy the
form in which it was submitted to the United Nations.
This report, prepared at the request of the United Nations, sets
out in summary fashion key legal issues likely to arise from the
development and deployment of Ocean Thermal Energy Conver-
sion (OTEC) systems. A number of such studies have already been
published and most legal issues appear to have been considered in
one or more of them.' However, a number of issues which may be
of importance appear to have thus far evaded mention or have re-
ceived summary treatment. Other matters have been treated in
nonsystematic fashion or severed from a context of other issues
which may emphasize their significance. As for a number of others
which have been treated, more might yet be said. Hence the ap-
proach which follows will be comprehensive, if summary. Refer-
ence is to international law, unless consideration of domestic
legislation is pertinent to the former.
One of the major problems with a legal evaluation of the con-
trol and regulatory issues of OTEC is that much of the technology
has yet to be developed; many extant uses are still unrefined. In
other cases the question of feasibility still remains. For example, it
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From the Oceans, 11 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 387 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Joseph]; see gener-
ally H.G. KNIGHT, J.D. NYHART & R.E. STEIN, OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION:
LEGAL POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS (1977) [hereinafter cited as OCEAN THER-
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is not yet clear whether OTEC enterprises can in fact be moored in
a single place for long periods. Present experience indicates that
mooring lasts only for a short period of time. Tort implications are
great. Nor is there great experience with the transmission of large
cables carrying high levels of electricity through or below the
aquatic environment. While individual OTEC pilot projects have
been tested in a limited fashion, there is as yet no experience about
the impact of numerous OTEC operations on the ocean. In partic-
ular, little is understood about the impacts of thermal pollution in
this medium. Nevertheless, the general promise of OTEC as a
technique for the harvesting of thermal energy, the technological
advances which have been made to date and the general foreshort-
ening of lead-time in technological development, make even specu-
lative consideration of the legal issues surrounding this technique
of energy harvesting quite urgent.
I. THE CONSTITUTIVE DIMENSION: WHO WILL MAKE LAW
ABOUT LAW-MAKING?
The first legal issue of major importance with regard to OTEC
activities relates to the question of the constitution or the constitu-
tive process - who will have the competence to make and apply
law about future law-making for these activities?2 Historically, the
law of the sea has been made and applied largely as an unorganized
arena, norms resulting from claims often made unilaterally and be-
haviorally which were either accepted or rejected.3 The resultant
patterns of behavior established and supported expectations about
appropriate behavior or law. It is quite conceivable that OTEC law
could be made in this fashion; those states having the necessary
technology undertaking thermal energy harvesting in the common
domain, either in their own waters or in those of third states, re-
jecting or accommodating protests, with the law crystallizing
through this customary process.
Given the intensity with which both historical and new uses
are being pursued in the maritime environment, there is widespread
feeling that the traditional unorganized process is insufficient.
2. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process ofAuthoritative De-
cision, reprinted in C.E. BLACK & R.A. FALK, I THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LE-
GAL ORDER 73 (1969). See also M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
DIGNITY 161 (1980).
3. See generally M.S. McDOUGAL & W.T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
OCEANS (1962).
426 Vol. I I
HeinOnline -- 11 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 426 1981
OTEC KEY INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES
Hence, there is substantial interest in replacing the traditional unor-
ganized arena with a more organized and institutionalized struc-
ture. This objective is pursued with greatest ardor by smaller states,
which recognize the possibilities of enhancing their own power.
Perhaps by inadvertence, the nascent "Seabed Authority" does not
appear to have been endowed with constitutive competence with
regard to OTEC. I believe Joseph4 is correct in his reading of the
Informal Composite Negotiating Text5 with regard to the "Author-
ity's" competence over thermal resources. It would not appear to
fall within its jurisdiction under ICNT Articles 135, 136 and 157.
This does not, however, mean that high seas OTEC operations will
be subject only to the jurisdiction of the flag state. Many other enti-
ties may claim authority to prescribe and apply law for all or part
of those activities.
Professor Knight notes the "philosophy of control" inherent in
the common heritage idea and contemplates "[less developed coun-
tries (LDCs)] seeking to include energy and other resources in that
area if it were politically feasible to do so. ''6 Hollick observes that a
strong Seabed Authority will certainly try to regulate high seas
OTEC operations, and also notes that the formation of regional
seas may lead to OTEC controls in former high seas areas.7 But
there are many other possibilities. It is possible to create a distinct
Ocean Energy Authority, with specified competence to authorize
the nascent Seabed Authority to prescribe for OTEC activities, to
enable the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO) to prescribe or to choose another agency. Each agency
presents a different political constellation in its decision making,
enhancing or weakening the power of particular groups. Leaving
the matter as an unorganized arena essentially accords competence
to those states endowed with the technological capacity to harvest
ocean thermal energy. The point of emphasis here is the centrality
of the "constitutive" issue and the urgency of its consideration.
4. Joseph, supra note 1, at 406, nn.87 & 88 and accompanying text.
5. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, Revision I, (ICNT), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/WP. 10/REv.1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ICNT].
6. Knight, International Jurisdictional Issues Involving OTEC Installations, reprinted in
OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION, supra note I, at 45-50 [hereinafter cited as Knight].
7. Hollick, International Policy Implications of Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Sys-
tems, reprinted in OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION, supra note 1, at 75-88 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hollick].
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II. JURISDICTIONAL REGIMES
Because a temperature differential of at least 300 Fahrenheit is
required for OTEC, not all of the oceans will contain the resource.
Washom and Nilles have described a circumferential belt overlay-
ing the tropics in varying configurations which can be viewed as a
thermal energy resource.' If this resource is not declared a part of
the common heritage or fails in some way to be subjected to a spe-
cial regime-an alternative which presents some attractions but
also many problems-we may assume that competence with regard
to the resource will be allocated in accord with the general princi-
ples of maritime boundary delimitation. Those states that discover
they have been indulged in this matter will be predictably compla-
cent in attitude and therefore champion the doctrine that the fickle-
ness of nature is not subject to regulation.
A. OTEC as a Resource
A first point, whose resolution is prerequisite to the issue of
national acquisition and title in ocean thermal energy, is the "re-
source" status of such energy sources. A number of writers have
expressed some doubt as to the "resource" status of the energy har-
vested through an OTEC operation. Others, Professor Knight no-
tably, have tried to characterize it analogically and teleologically.9
To some extent, doubts on this problem, if they were ever war-
ranted, have been allayed by the ICNT. But even in the absence of
the text, it is important to understand that a resource is not a fixed
and permanent thing. Rather, it is an artifact, a human creation
which is shaped by the interaction of human imagination, need,
technological capacity and environmental potential.
Thus, things which were not "resources" in the past become
resources now and may cease to be resources in the future. Con-
sider aluminum, a product of the neolin in clay. While we now
consider it a major and indispensable resource for an industrial and
science based civilization, it could hardly have been classified as
such several decades ago. By the same token, it seems clear that
any use of the ocean environment which yields substantial benefits
to human beings and which may be purposefully exploited should
be characterized as a resource. The social and legalfunclion of such
8. Washom & Nilles, Incentives for the Commercialization of Ocean Thermal Energy
Conversion, Report to the National Science Foundation Research Applied to National
Needs (1977).
9. Knight, supra note 6, at 60-67.
Vol. I I
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a characterization is to make that activity and its benefits subject to
community scrutiny with regard to exploitation, pricing, distribution
and conservation, and, if necessary, legal prescriltion for any of these
phases. 1o Whether the resource is available for capture or requires
an authorization raises different issues.
B. A Renewable Resource?
Ocean thermal energy may be characterized as a renewable re-
source only in the context of certain controlled techniques of har-
vesting. It is not an infinite resource because the space required for
an OTEC enterprise, and the limited areas of the globe in which the
temperature differential or gradient is sufficiently wide, results in
only a limited number of OTEC operations being capable of simul-
taneous operation. In this respect OTEC operations in high seas
areas, if they should prove feasible, are similar to the allocation of
space in the geostationary orbit. As the age of hydrocarbons ends
and energy sources such as the oceans become more urgent and
perforce more economical, there may well be a scramble for OTEC
positions. It would be wise for the United Nations to anticipate this
matter and to try to develop certain general principles of allocation
before the fact.
III. JURISDICTIONAL ZONES - MARITIME DELIMITATION
Joseph distinguishes carefully between conventional lex lata
and emerging law. Perhaps he is overly cautious. For better or
worse, the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case'1 has endorsed some of the
more radical prescriptive developments even when they failed to
secure the majority necessary according to the rules of the formal
arena. Some developments, whatever their wisdom, seem irrevoca-
ble: a territorial sea up to 12 miles, an exclusive economic zone of
200 miles including the seabed thereto even if it is not continental
shelf in the geological acceptance, and of course, a shelf to the lim-
its of its natural prolongation. Speculations on and planning for
OTEC regimes must realistically take these developments,
whatever the degree of their current authority, as matrices. Within
them, I would suggest that the identification of key legal issues pro-
ceed with a different categorization than that taken by writers, such
as Knight, Hollick and Joseph.
10. On this point see Arsanjani, International Control over the Pricing of Resources.- A
Configurative Approach, 3 YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 251 (1977). Emphasis added.
11. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case [1974] I.C.J. 3.
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In terms of the customary international legal distribution of
spatial competences, OTEC operations may be envisaged in five
distinct maritime zones. Where the depth increases rapidly from
the coastline, it is conceivable that OTEC facilities may be located
in a territorial waters belt, from three to twelve miles from the low
water mark. Beyond that belt, it may be necessary to consider the
possibility of claims for a contiguous zone. In addition, it would
appear that OTEC operations may be located in a belt extending
from the low water mark or other baseline to 200 miles. Where the
continental shelf extends beyond 200 miles from coastal baselines,
OTEC operations may take place in the high seas over these shelf
areas; a space over which title is apt to become clouded. Finally,
OTEC operations may be conducted beyond the 200 mile zone and
hence be considered a use of the high seas. Each of these uses de-
serves special attention.
A. Territorial Seas
Territorial waters, whether considered under the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone regime or
under the consensus provisions in the ICNT, are assimilated into
the territory of the coastal state. The single critical exception is that
the coastal state may not impede the right of innocent passage ordi-
narily available to other users. Innocent passage was probably
much broader under the 1958 Geneva Convention regime. As it
emerges in the various versions of the Law of the Sea Conference, it
would appear that the coastal state's competence to exploit its terri-
torial waters even at the expense of the traditional right of innocent
passage has increased greatly. 2 Under Article 21 of the ICNT the
coastal state is authorized to make laws and regulations relating to
innocent passage through the territorial sea in order to protect navi-
gational aids and "other facilities or installations." This language
would appear to be sufficiently spacious to include OTEC type in-
stallations. Moreover, Article 21 authorizes the coastal state to reg-
ulate innocent passage in order to protect "cables and pipelines."
From a practical standpoint, it would appear that not only may the
coastal state alone use its territorial waters for OTEC type opera-
tions, but it may establish such operations even at the expense of
other innocent passage users.
12. On this point see generally W.M. REISMAN, THE REGIME OF STRAITS AND NA-
TIONAL SECURITY: AN APPRAISAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 48
(1980).
Vol. I11
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A foreign OTEC plant ship making innocent passage would
appear to be prohibited from continuing its conversion operations
under the language of Article 19(2)(1) of the ICNT. This latter con-
sideration might become extremely important with regard to
archipelagic states which had exercised the privileges of straight
baselines offered in Article 47 of the ICNT and which had hence
enclosed stlbstantial portions of what otherwise would have been
high seas.' 3 A critical question may be the costs of suspending con-
version operations in a ship as a function of direct operating costs
and return on capital. The requirement of constant movement
through the oceans for such ships as a way of minimizing thermal
pollution has been analyzed in the technical literature and need not
be discussed here. The virtually plenary jurisdiction of the coastal
state in its territorial waters would appear to preclude any moored
or installation type OTEC facility without the coastal state's con-
sent. As for criminal and civil jurisdiction "on board," that would
be guaranteed an OTEC ship only if it were not harvesting and
hence in innocent passage. Otherwise, under the 1958 Convention,
jurisdiction would accrue to the coastal state, though the latter
might choose not to exercise it.
If the economics of OTEC ships, as opposed to moored facili-
ties, proves such as to preclude shutdowns during passage through
the now substantially increased territorial water belts of the world,
special bilateral arrangements or a multilateral treaty may be nec-
essary.
B. Contiguous Zone
The rapid acceptance of the 12 mile territorial sea limit and the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in customary international law has
probably rendered the contiguous zone of the Geneva Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone obsolete, at least in
the form in which it was envisaged in the treaty. Under Article 24
of that treaty, the contiguous zone could extend up to 12 miles from
the baselines of the territorial sea. Within the contiguous zone, the
coastal state acquires anticipatory jurisdiction to prevent infringe-
ment of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations and
punitive jurisdiction for violations of the above laws within its terri-
tory or territorial sea.
Foreign OTEC activities in the contiguous zone would proba-
13. On this interesting point see Knight, supra note 6, at 51-52.
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bly not have come under the jurisdiction of the coastal state stricto
sensu, for only in the most spacious sense could they be assimilated
to matters covered by, for example, sanitary regulations. But sub-
sequent to 1958, the notion of a type of "protective jurisdiction"
extending beyond maritime areas lawfully under coastal state juris-
diction and exercised to protect interests within that area, came to
be accepted. Instruments such as the Canadian Arctic protection
legislation extended that notion broadly.' 4
The conception of the contiguous zone contained in Article 24
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone may
be viewed as little more than codification of a general principle of
reasonable protective jurisdiction beyond one's territorial bounds.
It is possible that a similar type of contiguous jurisdiction will be
asserted by states beyond the 200 mile EEZ. Consider, for example,
a foreign OTEC operation 5 miles beyond a coastal state's EEZ.
Since many of its thermal consequences will be visited on the
EEZ's waters, the coastal state will plainly make claims and asser-
tions against that OTEC activity. The similarity between such
claims and the Canadian Arctic Act are striking.
This is the sort of problem which can be analyzed in terms of
Handl's adnormally dangerous activity or ADA (abnormally dan-
gerous activities) paradigm. 5 Its implications for further encroach-
ments on the shrinking area of the high seas and for international
conflict are sufficiently grave to warrant further study and recom-
mendations for legal clarification.
C. Exclusive Economic Zone
For better or worse, the Exclusive Economic Zone may be con-
sidered a recent creation of customary international law. While the
exact content of this new legal regime is as yet subject to negotia-
tion and change, the fact that there will be an exclusive economic
zone in which substantial privileges will be given to the coastal state
at the expense of traditional and/or new users is clear. As it
emerges from Part V of the ICNT, the Exclusive Economic Zone
14. An Act to Prevent Pollution of Areas of the Arctic Waters Adjacent to the Mainland
and Islands of the Canadian Arctic (1970).
15. Handl, An International Legal Perspective on the Conduct of Abnormally Dangerous
Activities in Frontier Areas: The Case of Nuclear Power Plant Siting 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1978); Handl, The Princple of "Equitable Use" as Applied to Internationally Shared Natural
Resources. its Role in Resolving Potential International Disputes over Transfrontier Pollution
REvuE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 40 (1978-79).
Vol. I11
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has increated the competence of the coastal state at the expense of
other users. Article 58 of the ICNT provides:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether
coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions
of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of the
navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables
and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea
related to these freedoms such as those associated with the oper-
ation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and
compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of interna-
tional law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they
are not incompatible with this Part.
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties
under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States
shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State
and shall comply with the laws and regulations established by
the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Con-
vention and other rules of international law in so far as they are
not incompatible with this Part.
But Article 56 provides that:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and ex-
ploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources,
whether living or non-living, of the sea-bed and subsoil and the
superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities for the ec-
onomic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the pro-
duction of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions
of this Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under
this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State
shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and
shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Con-
vention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-
bed and subsoil shall be exercised in acordance with Part VI.
Section l(a) explicitly grants sovereign rights to the coastal
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state for the exploring and exploiting of, inter alia, resources related
to "the production of energy from the water, currents and winds."
That formula would clearly appear to cover OTEC facilities. Sec-
tion l(b)(i) allocates to the coastal state jurisdiction with regard to
"artificial islands, installations and structures." Article 60 of the
ICNT grants the coastal state the exclusive right to do this. It
would appear that the coastal state's competence in the envisaged
exclusive economic zone is virtually as great as it is in the belt of
territorial seas. This sweeping competence applies whether we en-
visage plant ships, structures or facilities. The plant ship, while it
may perhaps traverse the exclusive economic zone in innocent pas-
sage, would appear to be required to suspend its conversion opera-
tions in the course of such passage lest it infringe the sovereign
rights of the coastal state with regard to this particular resource. A
structure of any sort be it moored, fixed or submerged and moored
in a dynamic fashion, could not be emplaced without permission of
the coastal state since it alone has the competence to create such
structures.
Many commentators have noted the ambiguity introduced by
the ICNT as to scientific research. Since OTEC operations in the
EEZ are subject to coastal jurisdiction and consent, we need not
consider the research problem here.
The issue of cables of a foreign state traversing another state's
EEZ is in my view more complicated than the treatment given this
subject by other commentators would suggest. Here, as in the high
seas, we should distinguish between two types of cable: surface and
sub-surface. Since the latter involves a physical and permanent in-
tervention into and occupation of the soil of what is now authenti-
cally defined as shelf, it is difficult to see how a third state can claim
such a use as of right. Cables on the shelf seem to be less of an
intervention and would appear to be assured under Article 4 of the
Continental Shelf Convention, though the Convention's bland as-
surance of coastal state cooperation with international users seem
unfounded. The coastal state may be concerned about the as-yet
unknown environmental consequences of high voltage transmission
in the marine environment and it is improbable that permission to
lay such lines would be given routinely. This is an issue which
should be carefully examined by experts.
Hollick suggests that an exception for certain OTEC's may be
carved in the rather comprehensive competence emerging for the
Vol. I I
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coastal state in its EEZ. 6 She argues that the exclusive economic
zone regime envisaged in the ICNT reserves navigation freedoms
and, by implication, military uses to all members of the interna-
tional community. Hollick suggests that foreign military enter-
prises supported by OTEC's as their energy source might then
freely use an economic resource of another state's EEZ as an exer-
cise of their freedom of navigation. Accepting the hypothetical ar-
guendo, an interpretation of the zone which overlooks the
economic harvesting of a military activity in a non-belligerent situ-
ation would seem most unpersuasive.
There is a curious imbalance of distribution of surplus re-
sources of the exclusive economic zone with regard to the harvest-
ing of non-living resources of that area. While Article 70 of the
ICNT grants contingent though preferential rights to "states with
special geographical characteristics," with regard to the living re-
sources of the exclusive economic zone, no comparable right is
given to such states with regard to the non-living resources. This
would appear to be an oversight and one would hope that before
completion of the Convention an appropriate arrangement for the
"special geographically characteristic" states will be made with re-
gard to activities such as ocean thermal harvesting.
D. High Seas Superacent to the Continental Shelf
Since 1958, there has been a strong conventional thrust to re-
tain the high seas status of these waters. Nevertheless, they are an
inviting area for unilateral coastal claims. Where the continental
shelf extends beyond the EEZ, one may expect increasing coastal
state claims over activities such as OTEC in the superjacent waters.
Thus Hollick states: "history suggests that all available legal argu-
ments will be employed to control OTEC activities over the margin
beyond 200 mi (sic)."'7
In contrast, Joseph suggests that textual analysis, apparently
on the exclusio principle, of Article 4 of the 1958 Continental Shelf
Convention would allow a foreign state to moor an OTEC facility
on the shelf without the coastal state's consent. Actually, the re-
gime of Article 4 is more complex than a "right-no-right" para-
digm; for it subordinates the use of the space by cable and pipeline
owners to the exploration and exploitation rights of the coastal
state. But that aside, the question of whether to generalize cables
16. Hollick, supra note 7, at 87.
17. Id.
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and pipelines to anything that simply uses the spatial aspect of the
shelf would appear much too important to be treated in such a
mechanical fashion. The ICNT resolves the ambiguity in favor of
the coastal state in Articles 79 and 80.
Arguments in legalist mode can be developed for both inclu-
sive and exclusive competence in this unique zone. The basic pol-
icy for OTEC as for all other ocean resources - maximum shared
access and optimum use - would not necessarily be fulfilled by
reserving superjacent waters to continental shelves in excess of 200
miles from the coast for inclusive users. This is a legal problem
which will have to be addressed.
. High Seas
The high seas are comprised of the water column beyond the
200 mile exclusive economic zone of coastal states and of the sea-
bed in the same water column area beyond the continental shelves
of the coastal states. Because, as mentioned, the continental shelf
may extend to the end of the geological shelf of the coastal state
and that geological formation may extend as far as 600 miles out to
sea, the high seabed in certain areas will be considerably smaller
than the superjacent high seas waters. This differential will have
definite legal consequences for different types of OTEC facilities,
especially for those which are moored.
Under contemporary law, OTEC plant ships would appear to
be able to traverse the entire area of the high seas in search of ap-
propriate thermal gradients, even if areas in which it is harvesting
solar energy are actually over the continental shelf of the most
proximate coastal state. Article 87 of ICNT provides a general
freedom of the high seas to all states. Fixed OTEC installations in
contrast will apparently be limited to the areas directly over high
seas subsoil. They may not be emplaced on the continental shelf of
a coastal state as of right, though they would be permitted under
the ICNT to lay cables and pipelines over the shelf of another state,
subject to the requirements of Article 79. But after the Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case, 8 that sort of formulation must be taken as, in
large part, an accommodation of the interests of the coastal state as
opposed to the international user. Here as elsewhere, one must be
wary of substituting text for reality. Different regimes and different
18. [1974.1 I.C.J. 3.
Vol. I I
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areas will apply on the high seas to plant ships or fixed facilities as
the case may be.
There may be special problems with regard to the lawfulness
of a fixed facility above the seabed of the high seas. The Law of the
Sea Conference may yet extend the notion of "common heritage of
mankind" to include resources in the high seas beyond those on the
seabed.
IV. JURISDICTION OVER ACTIVITIES ON THE HIGH SEAS
The jurisdictional discussions in various papers and published
articles is disappointing. Nowhere has it been treated systemati-
cally and in many instances, discussion shifted quickly to meta-
phorical devices. This is an area of major importance and should
be reconsidered systematically and thoroughly. The main issue is
jurisdiction on the high seas, since territorialization of the other
maritime zones means that coastal jurisdiction will generally apply.
Actually, the term "jurisdiction" is of limited use in juridical
inquiry. In the United States, following the 2nd Restatement on
Foreign Relations Law, it has been found more useful to inquire
about the allocation of competence to make law (prescriptive com-
petence) and to apply law (applicative competence). For any com-
plex human operation, the inquirer usually discovers that there are
a bundle of prescriptive and applicative competences, and rather
than being concentrated in the hands of a particular entity, they are
actually distributed between different entities. The so-called
"proper law of contract," for example, is actually a group of differ-
ent proper laws, some prescribing for the making of the agreement,
others for different aspects of performance and others for termina-
tion. Thus, in a contract, jurisdiction--the competence to prescribe
and apply law-may be divided among many different states.
If jurisdictional analysis for OTEC operations is undertaken
by reference to prescriptive and applicative competences, then a
larger heuristic model is required. It is the suggestion of this Au-
thor that future inquiry ask the following questions.
Competence to make law with regard to:
1. Establishment
a. organization of the OTEC entity, etc.
2. Conduct of Operations
a. access to pertinent ocean areas
b. determination of reasonableness with regard to compet-
ing uses
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c. conduct of operations
d. internal order of operations and facilities
e. safety vis-A-vis other maritime users
f. conservation
g. scientific research
3. Responsibility for Injuries
a. claim procedures
b. arenas
c. allocation of risk and measure of damages
d. enforcement
4. Termination
A number of items encompassed in the above outline deserve
special, although brief, mention.
Cables over deep seabed space, which should ultimately be de-
fined, would appear to be a lawful use requiring no special authori-
zation. Cables entrenched in the seabed are more problematic and
would appear likely to be subject to claims by the nascent Seabed
Authority.
There may be no statutory or conventional basis for safety
zones, but there is substantial practice and scholarly confirmation
of the lawfulness of excluding third parties from licit uses of the
ocean space when safety or efficiency requires the condition that it
be done in a reasonable fashion. Some exclusions have been far-
reaching. 9 Unquestionably, this, as many other areas, would bene-
fit by statutory or conventional clarification, but pending such pre-
scription, nothing should be done to undermine the customary and
indeed common sense notion of reasonable safety zones. The 500
meter safety zone allowed in the EEZ, in accord with ICNT Article
60, recommends itself on the high seas as well.
A more complex issue turns on the retention of exclusive areas
for OTEC, thereby barring other potential OTEC users or other
types of users from their access to the ocean space. The Deep Sea
Ventures claim to a comparable zone for the mining of manganese
nodules appears to have been rather universally rejected. However
that may have been occasioned by the bold challenge it presented
to the emerging Seabed Authority. Plainly, decisions will have to
be made on exclusive harvesting zones if OTEC is to be effective.
Knight suggests the use of the traditional "reasonable use" theory
or international ocean law.20 But an issue of this complexity would
19. McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective." Lawful Measuresfor
Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955).
20. Knight, supra note 6, at 53-58.
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appear to be most appropriately handled by formal international
agreement rather than by informal claim and response.
If ceterisparibus, plantships may use the high seas, may more
fixed facilities do so as well by mooring themselves to the seabed.
Joseph suggests that there is room for debate on this matter and
speaks of technical infringement in light of ICNT Article 137.21 I
find the suggestion quite implausible, comparable to characterizing
a fishing trawler's anchoring itself on the ocean floor as a technical
trespass on the Seabed Authority's domain and quite distinct from
mooring in the EEZ and even on the shelf. The same reservation
would apply to his discussion of fixed facilities at the edge of the
shelf but reaching into the abyssal depths.
The possibility of dynamically moored subsurface OTECs in
the high seas used as weapons sites has been bruited about. While
military instruments of mass destruction may not be emplaced on
the ocean floor, there would appear to be no textual prohibition for
their dynamic emplacement in the water column as part of an
OTEC complex. The lawfulness of such a high sea user must be
determined by reference to international security needs and com-
patibility with other licit high sea uses.22 But since such facilities
would lack the comparative undetectability of mobile submarines,
the likelihood of their emplacement in the foreseeable future seems
slim.
V. JURISDICTIONAL EVASIONS
The general principles of delimitation and allocation of com-
petence considered thus far, as they pertain to OTEC, represent the
international community's formal efforts to prescribe for the regu-
lation of events in or with substantial impacts on common domains.
A coordinate set of institutions has been developed to evade those
jurisdictional principles. In this respect, the problem of flags of
convenience in OTEC operations on the high seas, in the view of
most commentators, should be addressed. One of the functions of
flags of convenience has been to allow ship owners to evade the
legislative reach of tax, labor, safety and environmental controls of
certain governments, by substituting a more lenient goverment that
21. Joseph, supra note 1, at 403, with particular reference to n.84 and accompanying
text.
22. See generally M.S. McDOUGAL & F.P FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER (1961); W.M. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND EN-
FORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 836 (1971).
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is willing to lend its flag for a fee. International efforts to control
abuse of flags of convenience in general maritime practice by insist-
ing upon a genuine link have been largely unsuccessful and there
are substantial policy reasons militating against a more vigorous
pursuit of that effort. Of course, where an effective Authority regu-
lates access to high seas OTEC operations; be it a Seabed Authority
or a regional authority in regional ocean contexts; flags of conven-
ience will not be successful in evading standards established by the
Authority. But there are, as is well known, considerable misgivings
in the industrialized world about an overly extensive and effective
Seabed Authority. Be that as it may, the use of flags of convenience
will continue to be a problem in OTEC as in other general mari-
time uses.
Closely related to the flag of convenience as a technique for
jurisdictional evasion is the controversy over the character and sta-
tus of an OTEC facility. Resolution of that problem is only impor-
tant in terms of the effects it will precipitate. Certainly this has
been one of the most dissatisfying discussions in the OTEC litera-
ture. Writers ask, is an OTEC a ship, and proceed to answer that
question by using 18th and 19th century definitions of ship which
were designed for entirely different policy purposes. If they are in
favor of facilitating OTEC operations and believe that the status of
a ship will conduce thereto, they then conclude that an OTEC facil-
ity is indeed a ship.
From a policy standpoint, these analogical approaches should
be eschewed. The appropriate question is, what social and legal
consequences are to be determined by the characterization of a fa-
cility as a ship or as something else. Upon examination of those
consequences, there should then be an inquiry into the appropriate
policies that should govern them. It is on the basis of these policies
that status should be determined. An OTEC may be a ship for
some purposes but for other purposes it should be viewed as a
structure or indeed as an entirely new entity in ocean operations so
that new policies can be shaped to it accordingly.
VI. ENVIRONMENTAL AND RELATED TORT ISSUES
The external injuries which may be caused by an OTEC oper-
ation are quite diverse. In addition to breakdowns, foulings and
collisions, thermal pollution is an obvious problem. The OTEC op-
eration will unquestionably increase the surface temperature of the
ocean gradient with potentially negative effects on complex ecologi-
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cal systems. Since the reticulate network of interdependencies of
ocean areas is only dimly understood, the extent of the injury from
a single operation cannot now be guaged. Of course, ecological sys-
tems have a certain flexibility and are accustomed to adapting to
changes. But a change in ecology necessarily means that certain
human uses and exploitations theretofore based on the prior eco-
logical constellation may be obsolesced. For example, certain types
of fishing in areas where gradient temperatures have been changed
may be impeded. It is also possible that species of coastal fish,
which coastal fisheries with limited capacity for long distance fish-
ing have exploited, will move away from the coasts thereby depriv-
ing local industries of an important resource. Other complex
changes may take place in land areas.
Little inquiry has been made into the possible injuries which
may ensue from the transmission of high voltage from the OTEC
facility back to the land. It is generally known that high power
transmission lines do create certain electrical disturbances which
affect other electronic uses of the air space and may also have im-
pact on living creatures. Here again the problem will be to find an
appropriate balance between the ocean as a medium for solar en-
ergy harvesting and for all of its other traditional and anticipated
uses. This problem will not arise in those circumstances in which
the OTEC operation is conducted by a plant ship and the harvested
energy is immediately exploited in that area either in mariculture,
or the production of ammonia or hydrogen.
Change in an ecology is not per se undesirable or unlawful.
The critical question will be who, if anyone, will bear responsibility
for deprivations that appear to flow proximately from OTEC oper-
ations. Stein boldly proposes that there are fundamental principles
of law governing this matter.23
The Stockholm Conference Declaration, building on already ac-
cepted principles of international law and practice, developed
the basic rule of action that a nation is responsible for environ-
mental harm that it causes, or that is caused by activities carried
out under its jurisdiction, where that harm takes place outside its
national jurisdiction. The accepted principles and practice are
based on a number of precedents, including the Trial Smelter
Arbitral decision which stated that no state can use its territory
in such a way as to cause injury in the territory of another state
23. Stein, International Environmental Aspects, reprinted in OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY
CONVERSION, supra note 1, at 117, 120.
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and the Corfu Channel case before the International Court of
Justice which referred to each state's obligation not to allow its
territory knowingly to be used for acts contrary to other states'
rights. Moreover, the declaration also contained a principle that:
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the Seas
by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health,
to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or
to interfere with other legitimate uses of the Sea.
Alas, Part XII of the ICNT and in particular Article 192 do not
fulfill these expectations. In fact, the principles of international law
on this matter are not pellucid. Cases such as the Trial Smelter2 4
suggest that there is a type of nuisance responsibility in interna-
tional law. But some argue that the principle of the Trial Smelter
Case case was based on the compromis and not on the award.
More general statements to be found in the Stockholm Confer-
ences' declarations are of ambiguous authority. The general princi-
ples of state responsibility may not apply in circumstances in which
the activity causing an injury is not wrongful, as could be the case
in an OTEC operation. The general principle of law of due care
may not be appropriate since an OTEC enterpriser will probably be
able to demonstrate that such care was taken. Injunctive relief for
those who view themselves as likely to be injured by an impending
OTEC operation is not a real alternative in contemporary interna-
tional law, given the absence of compulsory jurisdiction. Even
where such jurisdiction may be operative because of a prior and
unqualified submission, it is not certain that an international tribu-
nal will rule that activities which may cause injury can be enjoined.
Some of the judges in the nuclear test ban case indicated in the
interim measures phase that the only remedy that might lie to a
party contemplating injury would be ex post facto." The final
phase of the case hardly clarified law in this area.
For all of these reasons, it may be desirable to clarify this par-
ticular matter prior to the extensive use of OTEC. A convention
negotiated either in a special conference or through an organization
such as IMCO might clarify the issue. It might be more economi-
cal, however, to have the General Assembly of the United Nations
issue a declaration of a general principle of responsibility for inno-
vative activities. The policy in such a legal innovation should bal-
ance the desire of the international community to encourage risk by
24. 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911, 1965 (1941).
25. [1973] I.C.J. 99, 111, 115.
Vol. I11
HeinOnline -- 11 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 442 1981
OTEC KEY INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES
venturing capital and innovativeness with the desire to protect
those who have made good faith investments on the expectation
that existing social and political constellations will continue.
An appropriate analysis of polymorphus environmental inju-
ries and the distribution of competence to deal with them should
work with four factual situations.
1. Injuries in coastal (territorial, EEZ) waters by transitting
foreign flag OTEC's and/or by foreign fixed facilities au-
thorized to harvest thermal energy in those waters;
2. Injuries initiating in activities in the above coastal waters,
but with impacts in the international area or other national
areas and/or on international users of the high seas;
3. Injuries by users in the international area with impacts on
coastal states;
4. Injuries by users in the international area with impacts on
other international users.
Some injuries will fall in several categories, for example 1 and 2
may overlap as may 3 and 4. The categories are primarily for ex-
ploring the distribution of competence to prescribe and apply law
to these events.
Category 1 is subject to national law, though it may be dis-
placed by convention or by some general or peremptory interna-
tional norm. Category 2, the most interesting of the four, imports a
complex system of shared jurisdiction with the coastal state, other
coastal states, the international community and the flag states of
other users able to claim some competence in the matter. The point
of emphasis here is that the mere fact that the event precipitating
the injury initiated in coastal jurisdiction does not grant the coastal
state exclusive jurisdiction. Consider the problem of location of
OTEC's as a way of externalizing costs. Hollick suggests that states
may move physically dangerous or environmentally destructive ac-
tivities, supported by OTEC's, to the very edge of the EEZ.26 The
potentiality of OTEC installations for causing injury to the envi-
ronment and to other legitimate users of the ocean means that the
choice of location of OTEC sites will itself be subject to interna-
tional legal standards. Joseph writes that subject to the innocent
passage burden and navigation notice, a State has complete author-
ity to authorize the location and operation of an OTEC facility or
vessel in the territorial sea. 2 I would not concur in that view.
26. Hollick, supra note 7, at 86.
27. Joseph, supra note 1, at 390-92 nn.20-25 & 40 and accompanying text.
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Handl has written extensively on the problem of the location of
ADA's in both international and national law.28 The temptation in
both systems of law to minimize the injuries visited on one's own
territory, and to externalize in so far as possible the costs of certain
activities, often impels enterprisers to locate an activity as close as
possible to the boundary with an alien. Handl suggests that this
operation may not be lawful and may indeed aggravate the liability
of a tort-feasor. Investigation is required to determine to what ex-
tent similar policies should be applied to the location of OTEC in-
stallations.
In categories 3 and 4, the mere fact that the event causing in-
jury initiated in the high seas, does not assure complete interna-
tional jurisdiction. Indeed, the concept of the "contiguous zone"
which was discussed above represents a persistent coastal state as-
sertion of competence to prescribe and apply law to events that im-
pact on its social and environmental processes.
A number of international conventions dealing with environ-
mental responsibility will probably apply to OTEC, among them
the 1973 IMCO Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, the 1972 Ocean Dumping Convention, and the 1973 Con-
vention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from
Ships and Aircraft. Joseph reviews several other instruments.29
VII. CONCLUSION
The importance of OTEC and the extent to which it may be
made operational are now sufficiently important enough to warrant
serious consideration of a comprehensive and systematic regime. A
draft might be prepared by an international committee of experts
and thereafter an international conference convened. The conven-
tion would deal with all aspects of OTEC operations and, by pro-
viding a common and effective regime, might accelerate its
development. Even if such a draft fail to receive acceptance, it
might, if effectively done, serve as a common standard. Given the
technical complexity of the subject and the difficult policy choices
to be made, it would be unwise to proceed to conference, whether
special or part of UNCLOS, without a detailed draft on which to
fall back.
28. See supra note 16.
29. Joseph, supra note 1 and see also OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION, supra
note 1.
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